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 UNDERSTANDING THE "PUNJAB
 PROBLEM"
 Gurharpal Singh
 Few subjects since the Emergency in India (1975-77)
 have commanded such attention as recent developments in Punjab: spe-
 cialists and nonspecialists alike have felt the need to comment on the
 events that preceded and followed the Indian Army's Operation Blue Star
 in June 1984. The purpose of this paper is not to add to this output, but
 rather to distinguish and evaluate the various explanations that have been
 offered for what is commonly referred to as the "Punjab problem." Such
 an exercise is unlikely to be comprehensive or satisfactory, but given the
 confusion that characterizes many of the accounts, its value would appear
 to justify the liberties taken. In this effort, I have divided the literature
 into five groups: Sikh nationalism, conspiracy theories, primacy of re-
 gional factors, primacy of national factors, and Marxist interpretations.
 These headings, it is stressed, are neither exclusive nor exhaustive; at best
 they provide divisions of convenience.
 Sikh Nationalism
 Sikh nationalism has been isolated as the main explanatory variable by one
 group of commentators. Writing in 1974, Brass observed that "of all the
 ethnic groups and peoples of north India, the Sikhs come closest to satisfy-
 ing the definition of a nationality or a nation." The achievement of a "co-
 hesive Sikh identity," he added, had at times the "appearance of an
 invincible, solidary, national force."' But these compulsions towards na-
 tionhood, particularly after 1947, were contained by the parameters of lin-
 guistic regionalism set by the new Indian national leadership and its
 alliance with secular Sikh political elites who successfully divided the com-
 Gurharpal Singh recently received the Ph.D. degree from the
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 1. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge
 University Press, 1974), p. 277.
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 munity and supported the formation of a Punjabi Suba.2 By the early
 1980s, so the argument goes, this delicate equipoise no longer existed; the
 Dharam Yud morcha (1982-84), whether by default or design, reopened
 the Sikh national question, and in the process became a "freedom move-
 ment,"3 a Sikh revolution in the making. Seen in this light, Blue Star was
 not a security operation but a clash of two nations, the first "war for Khal-
 istan. "4
 Although these interpretations either highlight the modernism of Sikh
 nationalism as a yearning to be a part of the international community of
 nation-states, or suggest that its objectives might fall short of statehood,
 both concur that the current "national revival" is predicated on four types
 of discrimination perceived by the Sikh community: constitutional, reli-
 gious, economic, and social. The rise of Bhindernwale, a charismatic
 leader who did not share the political culture of traditional Akalis, pro-
 vided a critical catalyst in beginning the process of transforming this con-
 sciousness of a discriminated minority into the consciousness of a nation.5
 Thus as the Dharam Yud morcha became enmeshed in futile negotia-
 tions, "a freedom movement always lurked at the edges because of the Sikh
 cultural and religious tradition that they were a sovereign people."6 More-
 over this movement possessed an overarching ideology in fundamentalism
 that entrapped the traditional Akali leadership and sought to demonstrate
 the individuality of Sikhism. By counterposing a new world view, funda-
 mentalism gradually undermined the existing ground of moderate Akali
 politics-electoralism, a lubricating corruption, and participation in the
 regional political system.7 But if the fundamentalist vision drew its inspi-
 ration from the Sikh achievements of the 18th century, its objective was
 essentially modern: to recreate a unit in which the Sikh community is a
 true repository of political power. In short, the Sikh nationalist wore
 many disguises; publicly, even Bhindernwale remained ambivalent on
 Khalistan.
 2. Cf., Joyce Pettigrew, "A Description of the Discrepancy Between Sikh Political Ideals
 and Sikh Political Practice," in Myron J. Aronoff, ed., Political Anthropology Yearbook I
 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 152-192.
 3. Joyce Pettigrew, "Take Not Arms Against Thy Sovereign: The Present Punjab Crisis
 and the Storming of the Golden Temple," South Asia Research, 4:2 (November 1984), p. 102.
 4. M. J. Akbar, India: the Siege Within (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985), p. 209.
 5. Sikh Youth Movement, The Sikhs and Recent Political Developments in India (Birming-
 ham: 1984), pp. 41, 46-57; K. R. Bombwall, "Ethno-nationalism," Seminar, 294 (February
 1984), pp. 44-51.
 6. Pettigrew, "The Present Punjab Crisis," p. 11 1.
 7. Angela Dietrich, "The Khalsa Resurrected: Sikh Fundamentalism in the Punjab," in
 Lionel Caplan, ed., Studies in Religious Fundamentalism (forthcoming).
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.5 on Fri, 21 Jun 2019 12:38:36 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 1270 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1987
 Conspiracy Theories
 In sharp contrast to the above interpretations are what I have termed con-
 spiracy theories. Put simply, they assert that the events that climaxed in
 June 1984 were the handiwork of those conspiring to dismember India by
 external aggression and internal extremism through the use of terror. The
 White Paper on the Punjab agitation published by the Indian government
 provides an illustrative example.
 The essence of the problem in Punjab was not the demands put forward by the
 Akali Dal . . . but the maturing of a secessionist and anti-national movement.
 The Akali Dal leadership allowed the initiative and control over the agitation to
 pass out of their hands [to the secessionists and terrorists]....
 The terrorists escalated their violence. With each passing day the situation
 worsened. The subversive activities of groups inside the Golden Temple had
 assumed menacing proportions in the context of India's security. The influence
 of external forces, with deep-rooted interest in the disintegration of India, was
 becoming evident. The Government was convinced that this challenge to the
 security, unity and integrity of the country could not be met by the normal law
 and order agencies at the disposal of the State. It was in these circumstances
 that the decision was taken to call the army in.8
 The White Paper's reluctance to detail the nature of "external forces"-
 beyond a catalogue of Sikh nationalist organizations in Western Europe
 and North America-is not shared by Balraj Madhok, an ideologue of the
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). For him, the roots of the "Punjab prob-
 lem" lie in the "Muslim connection." "Muslim imperialism" led by Paki-
 stan, argues Madhok, had attempted to divide Sikhs and Hindus-the
 Sikhs being a militarizedd" wing of Punjab's Hindu society.9 Interestingly,
 Madhok proposes a novel solution to the "Punjab problem": the restora-
 tion, by force, of Lahore as the new capital of Punjab, thus resolving the
 territorial dispute over Chandigarh and recreating "emotional unity" be-
 tween Sikhs and Hindus. 10
 Conspiracy theories also dominate explanations of Mrs. Gandhi's assas-
 sination. Ironically, though these have produced highly imaginative (and
 contradictory accounts), few writers have noted two obvious conspiracies:
 the attempted suppression by the government of the Citizens for Democ-
 racy publication, Report to the Nation: Oppression in Punjab, and the offi-
 cial inquiry into the assassination.
 8. White Paper on the Punjab Agitation (Government of India: 1984), p. 3.
 9. Balraj Madhok, Punjab Problem: The Muslim Connection (New Delhi: Hindu World
 Publications, 1985), p. vi.
 10. Ibid., p. 150.
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 Primacy of Regional Factors
 More serious studies have focused on developments in Punjab in an effort
 to identify general factors responsible for the present crisis. While most
 accept the importance of the ethnic cleavage between Hindus and Sikhs in
 shaping the creation of a Punjabi Suba, there is disagreement on the rea-
 sons for the collapse of the state's consociational political framework of the
 1960s and 1970s.
 Robin Jeffrey concentrates on the modernizing impact of the Green
 Revolution. For him, it accelerated the emergence of mass society: face-
 to-face village communities disintegrated; urbanization, consumerism, and
 mass literacy inflated expectations; ethnic identities became firmer em-
 blems of occupational competition; rootlessness, alienation, and graduate
 unemployment nurtured messianic tendencies, especially fundamentalism;
 and, above all, a revolution took place in communication, particularly
 political communication. Social change outpaced familiar political prac-
 tices and the ability of institutions to regulate them. Politicians accus-
 tomed to factional intrigues among elites now became "adrift on a sea of
 mass politics." In fact, they responded to these changes by launching "a
 desperate game in which few holds were barred." "Modernisation," as-
 serts Jeffrey, "played a large part in shaping the Sikh unrest (represented
 in its extreme form in the demand for a sovereign state) which ultimately
 led to the storming of the Golden Temple, Mrs. Gandhi's assassination
 and the 'communal violence' that ripped cruelly through New Delhi and
 other northern Indian cities in November 1984."1l
 Another integrated approach is presented by Murray Leaf for whom the
 Green Revolution also provides a point of departure. The "Punjab prob-
 lem," he argues, represents a choice between a pluralistic pattern of eco-
 nomic and political development favored by the Akali Dal and a
 Sovietized model of political economy followed by the state's-and the na-
 tion's-Congress administrations. The former stands for decentralization,
 ethnic and religious pluralism, and the use of ethical incentives to promote
 development; the latter, a quasimonopolistic party-government relation-
 ship, industrial domination of agriculture, and a distributionist socialist
 philosophy. Accordingly, the Akali agitation that crystallized around the
 Anandpur Sabha Resolution (ASR) should be interpreted as an attempt to
 create a new developmentalist order. The "Punjab crisis," Leaf concludes,
 "has not, fundamentally, been a clash between Sikhs and Hindus, nor be-
 tween Sikhs and Indira Gandhi. . . . It has been a clash between two
 11. Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, Mrs. Gandhi's
 Death and the Test for Federalism (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1986), esp. pp. 8, 2.
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 visions of the future and of India's proper political and social constitution.
 The basic questions remain unanswered."12
 The comprehensive outlooks of Jeffrey and Leaf are not shared by the
 rest of the regionally-centered literature. Most of it is too repetitive and
 isomorphic for detailed consideration, but some of the areas examined
 need to be mentioned. They include: the impact of linguistic reorganiza-
 tion on the Akali Dal's electoral support; the subsequent change in polit-
 ical recruitment to the Akali Dal, in particular the displacement of urban
 Sikh leadership by Sikh Jats who are held to be the main beneficiaries of
 the Green Revolution; the Akali Dal's adoption of a broad political and
 development policy, symbolized by the ASR, to accommodate conflicting
 caste and group interests while retaining the mobilizatory appeal of reli-
 gion; the demographic threat to Sikh majority status posed by the growth
 of migrant labor from other states; and the role of leading personalities,
 both within the Congress and the Akali Dal, in promoting ethnic con-
 flict. 13
 Primacy of National Factors
 Nearly all regionally inclined explanations make some reference to na-
 tional developments. Indeed, at this point the value of the distinction be-
 tween the former and the latter begins to diminish. Broadly, the nationally
 centered explanations can be divided into two: the role of Prime Minister
 Indira Gandhi's leadership and the collapse of the Congress Party, and the
 impact of modernization on the Indian political system. Mrs. Gandhi's
 role has been emphasized by one group of writers who argue that she de-
 liberately created the "Punjab problem" in order to exploit it. Her reluc-
 tance to resolve the Akali agitation, it is alleged, was part of a calculated
 strategy to divide the Akalis into moderates and extremists while cultivat-
 ing sympathy among a predominantly Hindu electorate. 14 The prime min-
 12. Murray J. Leaf, "The Punjab Crisis," Asian Survey, 25:5 (May 1985), pp. 475-489.
 13. Pramod Kumar et al., Punjab Crisis. Context and Trends (Chandigarh: 1984); Harish
 K. Puri, "The Akali Agitation: An Analysis of Socio-Economic Bases of Protest," Economic
 and Political Weekly (January 22, 1983), pp. 113-118; Yogendra K. Malik, "The Akali Party
 and Sikh Militancy," Asian Survey, 26:3 (March 1986), pp. 345-362; Paul Wallace, "The
 Sikhs as a 'Minority' in a Sikh Majority State in India," Asian Survey, 26:3 (March 1986), pp.
 363-377; Victor S. D'Souza, "Economy, Caste, Religion and Population Distribution: An
 Analysis of Communal Tension in Punjab," Economic and Political Weekly (May 8, 1982),
 pp. 783-792; M. S. Dhami, "Punjab and Communalism," Seminar, 314 (October 1985), pp.
 25-38.
 14. See, for example, R. Kothari and G. Deshingkar, "Punjab: The Longer View," in
 Abida Samiuddin, ed., The Punjab Crisis: Challenge and Response (Delhi: Mittal Publica-
 tions, 1985), pp. 622-626.
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 ister thus portrayed herself as the defender of the Hindu community, and
 in turn, reversed the conventional, post-1947 relationship between the
 center and moderate Akalis/Sikhs.15
 The need for Mrs. Gandhi to project herself in this way has also been
 linked to her emasculation of the Congress Party. Its nationwide, integra-
 tive, and bargaining function, it is suggested, had been on the decline since
 the early 1970s; Mrs. Gandhi's victory in 1980 hastened the process.16 Af-
 ter 1980 political power became further centralized in Delhi where "fawn-
 ers and flatterers"17 ruled supreme. Moreover, Mrs. Gandhi's domination
 over her party was reflected in the reappearance of a style that had charac-
 terized her Emergency years. It was a style that
 served one supreme end: [to] smash all threats to the political power of the
 ruling coteries and the projection of the prime minister as the supreme. The
 perceived threats came not only from within the Congress Party itself, and from
 the Opposition, but also from trade unions, the press, the judiciary, the students,
 the tribals, the rural poor whenever they turned rebellious. In fact, the threats
 came from within the country and from without, from the CIA, China, Pakistan
 and all those who were unhappy with "India's progress" and wanted to
 destabilizee" India. 18
 Perhaps the greatest "threat" was posed by the prospects of an electoral
 defeat, hinted at by midterm elections in some states in 1982 and 1983.
 The "Punjab problem" was thus transformed into a "Sikh threat" that was
 nationalized and placed outside the bounds of practical politics.
 An alternative way of reaching the same conclusion is to extend Jeffrey's
 mass society thesis, in a modified form, to the rest of India. The variables
 in the Punjab equation are changed: Hindus replace Sikhs; Mrs. Gandhi
 and her party, the grasping Akalis (though this time to retain power). The
 symptoms of rapid modernization are found inter alia in the growth of a
 new political culture, displacing the Nehruvian values by the criminaliza-
 tion of politics. 19 Though Mrs. Gandhi, in the words of Shourie, made a
 15. Dipankar Gupta, "The Communalising of Punjab," Economic and Political Weekly
 (July 13, 1985), pp. 185-190. See also the contributions in Amrik Singh, ed., Punjab in In-
 dian Politics. Issues and Trends (Delhi: 1985).
 16. Cf., W. H. Morris-Jones, "India-More Questions than Answers," Asian Survey, 24:8
 (August 1984), pp. 809-816; and James Manor, "Anomie in Indian Politics: Origin and
 Wider Impact," Economic and Political Weekly, annual number (May 1983), pp. 723-725.
 17. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Arnritsar. Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle (London: Cape,
 1985), p. 219.
 18. Kothari and Deshingkar, "Punjab," p. 623.
 19. This effectively makes up the other half of Jeffrey's thesis of a mass society as applied
 to the rest of India, though it must be emphasized that he remains ambivalent on whether the
 Hindu community constitutes a hegemonic ethnic group.
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 special contribution to the "enfeeblement"20 of the state, she and her party
 merely reflected contemporary India, what Jeffrey calls its "new" self2 '-a
 rapidly developing country undergoing economic, social, and communica-
 tion revolutions. Seen in this context, Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress
 party (like the moderate Akalis and their fundamentalist rivals) were
 hemmed in by the compulsions of competitive politics-their own rhetoric,
 the policies of the opposition parties, and the need to defend their constitu-
 ency. And if the "Punjab problem" ultimately led to disaster, it was be-
 cause the prime minister and her party rode the same political roller
 coaster as their principal rivals.
 Marxist Interpretations
 Finally, there are the Marxist interpretations, which mainly attempt to
 identify the interaction of three related issues: the "national question," the
 impact of economic policies in Punjab on the emergence of social classes,
 and the role of the Indian state. Most Marxist accounts of the "Punjab
 problem" proceed from the "national question," that is, the process of na-
 tionality formation in India as an integral part of the development of capi-
 talism.22 Included in this framework, with the usual dialectical
 contingencies and ambiguities, are operational definitions of classes, rela-
 tions of production, and the state. Depending on the assumptions made,
 India is either categorized as a multinational country, with a concurrent or
 a desynchronized development of the various nationalities, or is held to
 possess an "Indian nationality" that is prior to, and transcends, "linguistic
 regionalism."23 Thus, for the Communist party of India (Marxist)
 (CPI[M]), the distorted development of Punjabi nationality is the outcome
 of policies followed by the ruling party. According to the CPI(M), the
 Congress "perpetuated [and] exploited communal divisions," and it "never
 took a democratic stand . . . on the language issue or Punjab's reorganisa-
 20. Arun Shourie, "A Ruinous Tragedy," in Arun Shourie, et al., The Assassination and
 After (New Delhi: Roli Books International, 1985), p. 42.
 21. Jeffrey, What's Happening to India?, p. 1.
 22. T. V. Sathyamurthy, "Indian Nationalism and the 'National Question,'" Millenium,
 14:2, pp. 172-194; V. D. Chopra et al., Agony of Punjab (New Delhi: Patriot Pub., 1984).
 23. For differences on the Indian "national question," see Amalendu Guha, "The Indian
 National Question: A Conceptual Framework," Economic and Political Weekly (July 31,
 1982), pp. PE2-PE12; Javid Alam, "Dialectics of Capitalist Transformation and National
 Crystallisation: The Past and the Present of the National Question in India," Economic and
 Political Weekly (January 29, 1983), pp. PE29-PE46; Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Mod-
 ern India (Delhi: Vikas, 1984).
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 tion."24 Sathyamurthy and Gill and Singhal25 offer similar readings,
 though emphasizing the Congress's role in appeasing factions within the
 "ruling classes." In contrast, Asrafjan, Chopra, et al., and the Communist
 party of India (CPI) present a different assessment. Inclined toward the
 primacy of "Indian nationality," and the pre- and postindependence role
 of the Congress in shaping it, they stress the perversion of Punjabi "lin-
 guistic regionalism" by communalism, in particular, Sikh communalism.26
 Yet these differences betray strong similarities in identifying the nature
 of class relations in Punjab. All Marxists highlight the rapid increase in
 rural capital formation that began with the Green Revolution and coin-
 cided with the formation of a Punjabi Suba. The introduction of modern
 agricultural practices, they argue, led to peasant differentiation and the
 emergence of a class of "capitalist" farmers. This development, it is fur-
 ther asserted, sharpened contradictions between the capitalist farmers and
 the poor peasantry and agricultural laborers, and between the capitalist
 farmers and the all-India industrial bourgeoisie. Furthermore, in Punjab,
 these contradictions are said to have reinforced two other social cleav-
 ages-caste, in which Sikh Jats (capitalist farmers) intensified the exploita-
 tion of Mazbis and Ramdasis (agricultural laborers); and the urban-rural
 divide, in which the traditional ascendency of Hindu mercantile capital,
 established during the colonial period, was contested by the capitalist
 farmers.
 Despite these commonalities, however, differences reappear in charac-
 terizing the pre-June 1984 Akali agitation. For Bains, Sathyamurthy, and
 Gill and Singhal, the agitation was directed at changing the balance of
 national economic power, held by the "monopoly bourgeoisie/monopoly
 capitalist/big industrial houses," in favour of the capitalist farmers.27 As-
 rafjan, Chopra, et al., and the CPI, on the other hand, disagree. The dy-
 namics of the movement, they insist, were largely shaped by the communal
 ideology of the Akali Dal, its reluctance to abandon "confessional" politics
 in the quest for regional power.
 24. Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Lessons of Punjab (New Delhi: 1985), p. 18.
 25. Sucha Singh Gill and K. C. Singhal, "Genesis of the Punjab Problem: Its Historical
 Roots," Economic and Political Weekly (April 7, 1984), pp. 603-608; Sathyamarthy, "Indian
 Nationalism."
 26. K. Z. Asrafjan, "Soverrnennye sikhskie nacionalisticeskie tecenija v. Pendzabe," (Sikh
 Nationalist Trends in Punjab), Narody Azii i Afriki, 5 (1984); Chopra, et al., Agony of Punjab;
 Avtar Singh Malhotra, Save Punjab Save India (CPI: 1984).
 27. Sucha Singh Gill and K. C. Singhal, "Farmers' Agitation: Response to Development
 Crisis of Agriculture," Economic and Political Weekly (October 6, 1984), pp. 1728-1732; and
 Hardial Bains, The Call of the Martyrs: On the Crisis in India and the Present Situation in the
 Punjab (London: 1985).
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 These divisions are further evident in the contrasting evaluations of the
 role of the Indian state. Generally, ideological commitments and party
 affiliations determine the emphasis selected. For Banerjee, the "happen-
 ings in Punjab were not an isolated instance, but a symptom of the general
 ideological bankruptcy, brought about by the emergence of new socio-
 political forces unleashed by a lopsided development programme by the
 Centre."28 Bains also inveighs against the "big landlord/big capitalist"
 state, though adding that its ideological legitimation is underpinned by a
 skillful exploitation of the "Brahmanical order."29 Vanaik, too, draws at-
 tention to the "legitimation problem" of the Indian state, but for him this
 is connected with the political emergence of "intermediate castes" and the
 Congress's attempts to mobilize them under the new "hegemonising ideol-
 ogy" of "Hindu nationalism."30 Chopra and others are again an excep-
 tion, locating the "genesis of the Punjab problem" in the crisis of western
 "imperialism," its "neo-colonial" designs on India, and encouragement of
 Sikh extremism.31
 An Interim Conclusion
 The idea of a Sikh national revival, whether understood as a part of further
 ethnic consolidation or a drive toward statehood, fails to account for one
 significant fact: the relatively limited support for militants among the
 Sikhs in Punjab. These interpretations, in their extreme form, are only
 tenable if one proposes a nationalist's equivalent of "false consciousness,"
 that is, Sikhs are unaware of their "true" interest and are manipulated,
 divided, and ideologically brainwashed by the central government. Like-
 wise, the persistence of cross-cutting and overlapping economic, social,
 cultural, caste, and political interests of Sikhs and Hindus can only be de-
 nied by assertions that the two communities are monolithic entities, dis-
 cretely divided and mutually at war. Yet despite the tragic events of 1984
 and the continuing strife, a wholesale decoupling of these links has not
 occurred. Future polarization might lead in this direction, but there are
 equally sound reasons for believing the opposite.
 The conspiracy theories present the most unconvincing interpretations.
 In many ways the products of imaginative minds, they have lost any
 credence they might have possessed with Operation Blue Star and the sub-
 sequent persistence of terrorism in Punjab. Indeed, it is not difficult to
 conjecture that a militaristic reading of the "Punjab problem" and its con-
 28. Sumanta Banerjee, "Punjab," Economic and Political Weekly (July 7, 1984), p. 1019.
 29. Bains, Call of the Martyrs, pp. 130-195.
 30. Achin Vanaik, "India's Bourgeois Democracy," New Left Review, 154, pp. 55-82.
 31. Chopra et al., Agony of Punjab, pp. 8-9, 94-130.
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 tinual association with Pakistani machinations, might result in a conflict
 between India and Pakistan.
 Regionally centered accounts, on the other hand, suffer from two major
 limitations: a tendency toward exaggeration and an overemphasis on the
 Sikhs. Jeffrey's mass society thesis is based on a few selected social indica-
 tors which do not warrant such a construction. Similarly, Leaf's general
 framework overlooks the contradictory aspects of the Akali Dal's demand
 for economic and political autonomy-especially in the nonagricultural
 sector, and the articulation of this demand in terms of ethnic exclusivity-
 while stereotypically characterizing the regional and national Congress ad-
 ministrations. The other studies in this group, in contrast, are marked by
 a relative neglect of the Punjab Hindu's contribution to the "Punjab prob-
 lem," a tendency to treat the Sikh community in isolation as an independ-
 ent variable.
 Some of the same shortcomings are present in interpretations that stress
 the primacy of national factors. The use of modernization theory, for ex-
 ample, though analytically clear, still requires empirical verification.
 Nonetheless, these interpretations are, as the post-June 1984 events have
 demonstrated, more comprehensive than the individualization of the sub-
 ject in terms of Mrs. Gandhi's personality.
 Finally, the Marxist interpretations are certainly the most comprehen-
 sive in integrating the various analytical levels of the "Punjab problem."
 This achievement, however, is obtained at the cost of much simplification
 and reification-of class, caste, party, and the state; of nationality, commu-
 nity, and regional loyalties; and of class and nonclass loyalties. With a few
 notable exceptions, nearly all of this literature belongs to the school of
 'vulgar Marxism."
 Overall, the recent publications on the "Punjab problem" share several
 common shortcomings. There is a profusion of unclear definitions, as-
 sumptions, and ambiguities. Few attempts have been made to demarcate
 the relevant analytical levels of the issue. And almost all the studies men-
 tioned are flawed by the lack of sufficient empirical data-from the con-
 spiracy theories to Marxist class alignments, from the Sikh nationalist
 interpretations to the regional problems of the Akali Dal, and from the
 structural changes in the Indian political system to factional infighting in
 Punjab. Although many of the works examined filled an immediate need
 to explain dramatic events, their general contribution to an understanding
 of the subject remains limited. The "Punjab problem" still stands in need
 of a rigorous analysis.
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